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Between all fronts: The impact of World War I on Eastern-
European Jewry
During World War I Eastern European Jewry found themselves on either 
side of the front, since their homeland had become a theatre of war. As 
Russian Army leaders regarded the Jews as traitors and spies, they made 
them scapegoats for their own military failures. The hope that the situation 
would improve under the Central Powers was only partially fulfilled. 
Although Jews were no longer charged en masse with espionage, the distrust 
continued as Jews were still associated with treason, epidemics and 
prostitution. The war confirmed the anti-Semitic stereotypes of many – with 
tragic consequences for the future.
Im Ersten Weltkrieg fand die jüdische Bevölkerung im östlichen Europa sich 
auf beiden Seiten der Front wieder, da ihre Heimat zum Kriegsschauplatz 
geworden war. Die russische Armeeführung sah in Juden Verräter und 
Spione und machte sie daher zu Sündenböcken für ihr eigenes militärisches 
Versagen. Die Hoffnung, dass sich die Situation unter den Mittelmächten 
bessern würde, erfüllte sich nur bedingt. Zwar wurde der Vorwurf der 
Spionage nicht mehr kollektiv erhoben, man misstraute der jüdischen 
Bevölkerung aber weiterhin und brachte sie mit Verrat, Seuchen und 
Prostitution in Verbindung, denn viele sahen ihre antisemitischen 
Vorstellungen bestätigt – mit tragischen Folgen für die Zukunft.
When in August 1914 war broke out, few could foresee that the conflict would turn
into  World  War  I.,  especially  not  those  most  concerned,  the  ordinary  people.  As  the
historian Zvi Y. Gitelman once put it:
“A Russian peasant was reported to have asked, ”If our Tsar is at war with the
German Kaiser, does this mean that we ordinary people will have to go fight?” The
Jews similarly asked what could the fight between the ”Fonye Ganev” and Kaiser
Wilhelm have to do with them.”1
They would find out very soon. With the start  of hostilities,  the area in which the
mainly Yiddish-speaking Eastern-European Jewry lived was transformed into a zone of
military operations,2 and the Jews ended up between all fronts.
1 Gitelman, Zvi Y.: A Century of Ambivalence. The Jews of Russia and the Soviet-Union 1881 to the Present. New York: 1988. 
p. 81. ‘Fonye Ganev’ was a unpleasant nickname used in Yiddish for the Russian Zar. 
2 On the east-European Jewry during World War I in general see my book: Schuster, Frank M.: Zwischen allen Fronten. 
Osteuropäische Juden während des Ersten Weltkrieges (1914-1919), (Lebenswelten osteuropäischer Juden, 9) Köln, Weimar, 
Wien 2004, in which I am dealing with all the topics I am focusing on here in length and in a broader context. 
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But in the beginning nobody knew what to expect.3 While the elder and more religious
Jews on both  sides  of  the  front,  thought  that  this  war,  as  any war,  would be  a  great
catastrophe in general, and especially for the Jewish population, the younger ones saw it
as a chance for liberation. At least some Austrian Jews thought of the war against Russia
in  terms  of  a  holy  war  that  would  liberate  their  people  from  Tsarist  oppression  and
declared their  loyalty  to  their  country.4 The Jews in Russia surprisingly  did  the same,
hoping that by doing so, they were to gain more rights.5 Both groups were destined to be
taken by surprise. 
Instead  of  liberating  Russia,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army was forced to  withdraw
when the Russian Army unexpectedly marched into Eastern-Galicia in mid-August 1914.
Especially for the Jewish civilian population, this was a shock. The trust and hopes most
of them had put into their  protector,  Emperor Franz Joseph as a symbol  of  the non-
national Habsburg Monarchy, turned out to be in vain.6 More than half  of  the Jewish
population of Galicia was forced to flee, was evacuated or deported by their own army.7 
“So one could have been expelled from eastern-Galicia by the Russian occupation-
force or effects of war, and a few days later been evacuated from ones place of
refuge in one of the Galican towns by the Austro-Hungarian army. While fleeing
from the immediate territory of war, one could just as well be arrested by one’s
own army and as a suspect  of espionage interned in the hinterland,  and from
there  -  after  the  suspicious  facts  turned  out  to be unfounded  -  deported as  a
‚refugee‘  into  a  refugee-camp.  One  could  be  evacuated  into  the  rear-territory
during a ‚strategic evacuation‘ in the scope of a ‚scorched earth policy‘, leaving the
advancing Russian Army without manpower, and from there as a sanitary threat
for the army or because of the communities' overburdening supply-problems in
the rear-territory,  deported into the hinterland,  only to be denounced there as
‚refugee‘.”8
Thus ‚refugees‘  were suspected of being disloyal ‘elements’, and therefore potential
spies for the Russian enemies. As Jews did not remain in the territory of war to ‚defend‘
their fatherland they were seen as cowards, - both by the army and the non-Jewish society
in  general.  But  the  orthodox,  mainly  Chasidic  Jewry,  were  not  the  most  mistrusted
3 Cf. for the following: Schuster: Fronten 2004, pp. 112–122. 
4 Cf. Rozenblit, Marsha L.: Reconstructing a National Identity. The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I. Oxford et
al. 2001, pp. 39–58
5 Cf. Greenberg, Louis: The Jews in Russia. The Struggle for Emancipation. Vol. II. Ed. by Mark Wischnitzer. New Haven/CT
1951, pp. 94–95; Frumkin, Jakov G.: ”Iz istorii russkogo evrejstvo”, in: Kniga o russkom evrejstva. Ot 1860-ch godov do 
revolucii 1917 g. Ed. by Ja. G. Frumkin et al. New York 1960. pp. 27–117, here p. 85–87, English edition: Frumkin, Jakov G.: 
”Pages from the History of Russian Jewry”, in: Russian Jewry 1860–1917. Ed. by Jakob Frumkin et al. New York: 1966. pp. 18–
84, here: pp. 56-58.
6 Cf. Schuster, Frank M.: „ …wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel“ Der Erste Weltkrieg in Galizien und der Bukowina aus 
jüdischer Sicht, in: Transversal. Zeitschrift des Zentrums für jüdische Studien 9 (2008), pp. 33-58, here pp. 39–41. 
7 Cf. Kreppel, Jonas: Juden und Judentum von heute. Zürich et al. 1925, pp. 65–66. On the number of refugees and the 
problem of estimating it see: Mentzel, Walter: Kriegsflüchtlinge in Cisleithanien im Ersten Weltkrieg. Unpublished 
doctoral-dissertation. Vienna 1997, especially pp. 4–7 and Hoffmann-Holter, Beatrix: «Abreisendmachung». Jüdische 
Kriegsflüchtlinge in Wien 1914 bis 1923. Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995, pp. 31-74, 143–159 and especially the table on p. 283.
8 Mentzel: Kriegsflüchtlinge 1997, p. 11. Cf. Mentzel, Walter: Kriegserfahrungen von Flüchtlingen im Nordosten der 
Monarchie während des Ersten Weltkrieges, in: Bachinger, Bernhard/Dornik, Wolfram (Ed.): Jenseits des 
Schützengrabens. Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten: Erfahrung, Wahrnehmung, Kontext. Innsbruck 2013, pp. 359–390, here 
p. 391; Mentzel, Walter: Kriegsflüchtlinge in Cisleithanien 1914–1918, in: Heiss, Gernot/ Kolb, Oliver (Ed.): Asylland wider 
Willen. Wien 1995, pp. 17–44.
Frank M. Schuster: Between all fronts: The impact of World War I on Eastern-European Jewry.
Medaon 10 (2016), 18 – URL: http://www.medaon.de/pdf/medaon_18_schuster.pdf 2
ethnicity in Galicia. The Ruthenians, the Ukrainian subjects of the Dual-Monarchy, were
seen as Russophil Slavs by large parts of the Austrian army, blamed for their military
failures,  seen  as  scapegoats  and  hanged  en  mass  as  spies.9 Jews  were  not  feared  and
suspected as much, at least not in the territory of war itself. In the hinterland however the
situation was very different. The population in inner-Austria, especially in cities such as
Vienna, Prague and, Budapest, where the people, who had lost nearly everything but their
lives, often ended up, were far from welcoming, especially not to Jews. The bureaucracy,
as well as people in general, became more and more afraid of epidemics being spread all
over the country by these poor, lousy and dirty people, who came from the edge of the
monarchy, the edge of civilisation.1
 During the war the atmosphere in Austria-Hungary
became more and more Antisemitic11. 
For those left behind in the Russian occupied eastern Galicia, the situation was no
better, than the later famous Galician-born Austrian writer Manès Sperber remembers: 
“The shtetl was cut off from the outside world. Mail was stopped to and from the
unoccupied  portion  of  the  [Austrian,  FMS]  monarchy,  and  the  shtetl  seldom
received  a  sign  of  life  even  from  the  neutral  countries  So  many  families  had
depended on the few dollars that came letters from their relatives in America, who
usually promised to set steamship tickets and looked forward to welcoming them
in  New  York.  But  now  no  letters  or  the  dollars  arrived;  poverty  became  an
oppressive hardship, from which there was no escape.” 12
It became even worse,  when epidemics started to spread among the poor, hungry
population that  could  no  longer  resist  disease.  .13 Unsurprisingly,  many Jews secretly
hoped for the Austrians to come back, and in between tried to survive as best as they
could. To the Russian army command, the fact that most of the Austrian Jews remained
loyal to their  Kaiser,  was not seen as a  result of the present situation, but justified by
previous  Antisemitic  suspicions  that  seem  to  have  been  even  stronger  than  the  ones
existing in some parts of the Austrian army and bureaucracy. 
In  1912,  a  questionnaire  was  sent  from  the  Ministry  of  War  to  50  high-ranking
generals.  Regarding  Jews  in  general  and  specifically  those  in  the  army,  the
questionnaire’s  responses  indicated that  Antisemitism was widespread amongst  those
9 Cf. Holzer, Anton: Das Lächeln der Henker. Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die Zivilbevölkerung 1914-1918. Darmstadt 2008, 
pp. 44–85; Holzer, Anton: Die andere Front. Fotografie und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg. Darmstadt 32012, pp. 228–261.
1
 Cf. e. g. the reports of the Galician governor Statthalter Hermann von Korytowski: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Vienna 
(hereafter: ÖStA) Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv (hereafter: AVA) Ministerium des Ineren (hereafter MdI) Präs. 19/3 Zl. 
453/15 and ÖStA Kriegsüberwachsungsamt (hereafter: KÜA) Zl. 7617, in detail: Schuster: Fronten 2004, pp 122–160; 239–249. 
About the situation of the Jewish refugees in Austria after they left the theater of war see: Rozenblit: Reconstructing 2001; 
Mentel: Kriegsflüchtlinge 1997; Hoffmann-Holter: Abreisendmachung 1995; Rechter, David: The Jews of Vienna and the 
First World War. Oxford 2000.
11 In using this unfortunately still rather uncommon spelling, I follow Shlomo Bergmans suggestions, to make it clear, that 
Antisemitism is not anti-Semitism, because it is neither directed against all Semites, nor has it anything to do with Semitic 
languages, because Semitism is a linguistic term. Cf. Bergman, Shlomo: Some Methodological Errors in the Study of 
Antisemitism. In: Jewish Social Studies 5 (1943), pp. 43-60.
12 Manès Sperber: God's water carriers. New York ; London: 1987, p. 80. For the original cf. Manès Sperber: Die 
Wasserträger Gottes. (All das Vergangene... 1). Frankfurt a. M. 1993. p. 132.  
13 Cf. Baruch, Milch: Barucha Milcha galicyskie wspomnienia wojenne 1914-1920, in: Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu 
Historycznego 172–174 (4/94–2/95) pp. 123–133, here pp. 128–129; Baruch, Milch: Testament. Z Archiwum Żydowskiego 
Instytutu Historycznego. Warszawa 2001, pp. 16–18. 
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who occupied key positions in the Russian army and that nearly all of them wanted to get
rid of the Jews, at the very least in the army, if not in general.14
So it  is  hardly  surprising that  on July 26 th/August  8th 191415 –  the  same day N.  M.
Fridman, one of only three Jewish members of parliament, expressed his loyalty to Russia
in a noted speech in the Duma16 – the 2000 Jewish inhabitants of a Shtetl near Lodz in
central Poland were accused of espionage for the enemy, expelled by the local commander
and not allowed to come back, despite a contrary order by the governor.17 This case, one
out of hundreds that were still to come, suggested that not only Habsburg Jews but also
Russian Jews were seen as an unreliable minority, that was viewed to be treacherously at
the service of the Central Powers. Russia turned against its own subjects. 18 And similar to
the Austrian Army’s behaviour, Jews were not the only ones to blame. After the outbreak
of the war Germans, who had lived in Russia for centuries, and saw themselves mainly as
Russians,  were confronted with an atmosphere of  general  germanophobia.  They were
treated like enemies who could not be trusted. They were deported too and their land was
confiscated. As in the case of the Jews, the accusation of espionage had no real  basis.
Scapegoats had to be found, especially when poor communication resulted in the Russian
Army losing battles against the Germans, and later, the Austrians. As V. A. Obolenskij, a
well informed Russian bureaucrat later wrote in his memories: 
“No matter what, it was necessary to find people to blame. So they were found.
The Jews were responsible: they were living in front-line areas and were engaging
in espionage. This was the source of the order to remove the Jewish population
from  the  front.  The  masses  of  the  troops  believed  this  libel  on  the  Jews  and
sympathised with the order.”19
Limited evacuations of the Jewish population from areas of combat soon turned into
large-scale deportations and hostage taking. These measures accelerated into plundering,
executions and pogroms. The situation became even worse after the general offensive by
Germany and Austria in spring 1915. In addition, there was Russia’s failed copy of the
‚Great Retreat of 1812,‘ during which they, not only had to withdraw from most of the
occupied Austrian territory, but also left Poland, large areas of the Baltics, Byelorussia
and later on Ukraine, to the Central Powers.
14 Cf. Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Voenno-Istoričeskij Archiv, Moskau f. 400 op. 19 d. 37, Central Archives for the History of 
the Jewish People Jerusalem HM2 8279.6. 
15 If two dates are given the first one refers to the Julian Calendar used in Russia until February 1918, and the second to the 
Georgian Calendar, used in the rest of Europe.
16 Cf. Frumkin: Istorii 1960, p. 85, Frumkin: Russian 1966. p. 58, Greenberg: Jews 1951. Vol. II, pp. 94–96.
17 Cf. Iz ‘černoj knigi’ russijskago evrejstva. Materialy dlja istorii vojny 1914–1914 g. Pod. red. A. Cernovskij, P. V. Viktorov. 
pp. 197–227, in: Evrejskaja Starina 10 (1918) pp. 195–296, here p. 232.
18 About Russia’s politics against it’s own subjects see: Lohr, Eric: Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaign against 
Enemy Aliens during World War I. Cambridge/MA, London 2003; Graf, Daniel W.: The Reign of the Generals: Military 
Gouvernment in Western Russia 1914–1915. Unpubl. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Nebraska. Lincoln: 1972. and specially 
about the Jews: Lohr, Eric: The Russian Army and the Jews. Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence during World War 
I”, in: The Russian Review 60 (2001) pp. 404–419, Goldin, Semion: Deportation of Jews by the Russian Military Command 
1914–1915, in: Jews in Eastern Europe (Spring 2000), pp. 40–73; Schuster: Fronten 2004, pp. 161–233. 
19 Obolinskij, V. A.: Moja žizn’, moj sovremenniki. Paris 1988. p. 477. For the English translation see: Goldin: Deportation 
2000, pp. 46–47. 
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To justify for instance the mass deportations of Jews from the province of Courland to
the outside world, the order from April 25th/May 8th 1915 was declared a reaction to a case
of supposed Jewish treason in the village of Kuzhi, reported in an army newspaper and
later reprinted in all the Russian Empire official papers. The report read:
The Jews of the village of  Kuzhi hid German soldiers in their cellars,  who had
entered the village […] At night, they led the German soldiers from the cellars, and
the entire Russian military unit with Colonel Vasilov at the top was massacred by
the  Germans treacherously.  With  those Jews of  the  village, who were directly
involved in treason, was dealt according to martial law  hesitation, the rest were
sentenced to banishment.”2

The whole story was a fabrication, as the two Duma members, the Jewish MP for the
neighbouring province of Kowno,  N. M. Fridman and A. F. Kerenskij, the later Russian
Prime minister, found out during a field trip and presented in front of parliament:
“In the village of Kuzhi there are merely three houses owned by Jews; in the whole
village there exist absolutely no basements, neither Jewish nor Christian; in the
list of officers of the north-western troops as well as the relevant casualty lists is a
Colonel Vasilov not to be found; not a single Jew in the village of Kuzhi was either
hung(hanged), nor put in front of a firing squad, or put on trial for treason at all.
[...] The Jews fled from the village of Kuzhi because of German artillery fire along
with  the  Russian  military  unit;  they  were  protected  all  the  way  by  the
commanding officer and even the troops rendered them any assistance, thanking
them this way for services rendered to the military unit during their stay in the
village.”21 
By the time this came to be known to the public at the beginning of May 1915, the
deportation of about 190 000 Jews, however, was already completed.22
Although the situation of Germans and Jews seems comparable,  the methods used
against the Russian Jewry were different from the ones used against others, as Eric Lohr
pointed out: 
“First,  mass deportation orders covering large territories well  behind the front
were only attempted for a brief period, then abandoned in favor of deporting only
from areas where the army was present. Thus, the troops played a larger direct
role  in  implementing  the  deportations  and  expulsion  of  Jews  than  for  other
groups.  A  second  and  related  feature  is  that  the  deportations  were  far  less
organized, and much more often accompanied by violence, looting, and popular
participation than was the case for other groups. Railroad transport was provided
far less often, and areas were more often cleared of Jews through direct expulsion
order, terror-induced, mass refugee movements. Under a condition of a wave of
2
 Published in: Gessen’’, Ju. V. (Ed.): Dokumenty presledovanii evreev, in: Archiv Russkoi Revolucii 9 (1928) pp. 245–284, 
here p. 255. (dok. 18.). 
21 Quoted in: Vinaver, M. M.: Doklad’’ po evrejskomy voprosy Zentral’nago Komiteta Partii Narodnoj Cvobody na 
Konferenzii gelegatov’’ partii, sostojavšejsja 6-8 Ijunja 1915 g., in: Cernovskii, A. und Viktorov, P. V. (Ed.): Iz ‚chernoi knigi 
russiiskago evreistva. Materialy dlja istorii vojny 1914–1914 g., pp. 197–227, in: Evrejskaja Starina 10 (1918) pp. 195–296, here 
pp. 222–224. Cf. Frumkin: Istorii 1960, p. 91 f Frumkin: History 1966, pp. 65–69. 
22 Vgl. Goldin: Deportation. S. 54.
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pogroms and local  orders  to Jewish communities  to leave regions under  army
control, the difference between Jewish deportees, expellees and refugees became
less distinct than for other groups.”23
The methods used and tested against Jews and Germans were used later on other
ethnic non-Russian subjects of the Tzar, as the problems of conducting a successful war
were increasing. The consequence was that from 1915 onwards millions of people were on
the move.24 But whereas the Russian, and even the German, attitude towards these groups
derives mainly from the concrete situation of war, and is as such quite similar to the
Austrian attitude  towards  the Rutheniens,  the  motivation for  making the Jews ‚inner
enemies‘ goes far beyond the immediate context of the war against each other. 25 The basis
of the attitude towards the east-European Jewry – so it  seems – has been deep-rooted
Antisemitism from all combatants.26 Neither the Russian generals and officers, nor many
of their counterparts within the Central Powers, were able or willing to see in the Jewry
they  confronted,  anything  but  an  Antisemitic  image.  Instead  of  seeing  the  poverty,
epidemics and Jewish struggle for survival mainly as a consequence of war and their own
policy  towards  Jewry,  many  people  in  the  Russian,  Austrian  and  German  army  and
administration, as well as other groups within the non-Jewish population, found their
Antisemitic  prejudices  of  the  parasitic,  infected,  contaminating  Jew  continually
infiltrating the invading forces confirmed. 
The Russian Army not only blamed Jews for being spies and spreading diseases like
cholera or typhoid fever, some generals went so far as to assume that Jewish prostitutes
infected Russian soldiers deliberately with venereal diseases. Prostitution and especially
syphilis  were  serious  problems  for  the  army  particularly  during  the  retreat  when
discipline  decreased.  The  commander  in  chief  of  Russia’s  southwestern  front,  N.  N.
Ivanov, who had total control over a territory reaching from eastern-Galicia in the west
and  in  the  east  beyond  Kiev,  put  prostitutes  under  military-control  and  severe
punishment, trying to keep the situation under control, but in vain. And once again it was
easy  for  General  Ivanov  to  find  somebody  to  blame:  It  seems  he  really  believed  that
German-Jewish organizations invested huge sums of money to pay prostitutes to infect
Russian officers and soldiers.27 This had the same logic as the reproach that all Jews were
spies. Maybe a few Jews really were on the German payroll, and no doubt some Jewish
women and girls worked as prostitutes, but surely not en mass.28 And the reason for Jewish
prostitution was definitely  not the distraction of  the  Russian army nor  the girls’  low
23 Lohr: Nationalizing 2003, p. 138.
24 Cf. Gatrell, Peter: A Whole Empire Walking : Refugees in Russia during World War I. Bloomington/IN 1999.
25 The consequences of the First World War for the Russian Jews and their perception by the Russian society have so far not 
been studied in detail, but currently Anastasia Surkov works on a research project at the Zentrum für 
Antisemitismusforschung (Center for Research on Antisemitism) in Berlin, entitled: Die Radikalisierung des 
Antisemitismus in Russland und der Sowjetunion während des Ersten Weltkrieges und der ersten Jahre der 
Zwischenkriegszeit. Very interesting results are to be expected to come out of this project.
26 Sarah Panter has recently compered the Jewish war experience of German, Austrian, British, and American Jewry, but 
had to leave the Russian Jews out: Panter, Sarah: Jüdische Erfahrungen und Loyalitätskonflikte im Ersten Weltkrieg 
(Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz 235), Göttingen 2014.
27 Cf. Hirschfeld, Magnus/ Gaspar, Andreas (Eds.): Sittengeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs. 2. Ed. Hanau [1964] pp. 192–193; 
YIVO Institute for Jewish Research New York (hereafter YIVO) RG 348, Lucian Wolf/David Mowshowitch Collection, Folder 
64, Jewish Conjoint Committee London Report No. IX. Sept. 16th 1916–Feb. 6th 1917, p. 7029; Bernstein, Laurie: Sonia’s 
Daughters. Prostitutes and their Regulations in Imperial Russia. Berkeley/CA et al. 1995, p. 294.
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morals. The main reason was simply poverty,  and prostitution was one of the ways to
ensure their survival and to keep the family alive during a war. 29 When the German army
conquered Poland this was one of the first things the soldiers noticed, as for instance Dr.
Theodor Rosenthal,  a Jewish doctor, who as part of the German army in 1915 came to
Warsaw: 
“If  one  arrived  at  the  train-station  in  Warsaw  a  lot  of  Polish  Jewish  woman
attracted your attention, often with babies in their arms, begging for bread and
who for bread offered all kind of things, themselves, too.” 3

But although the Austrian and German armies perceived themselves to be liberators,
the  situation  did  not  improve.31 True,  Jews  were  no  longer  in  immediate  danger  of
expulsion or deportation; neither did they need to fear for their lives. 
But when eastern-Galicia was re-conquered, the Jewish population was still seen as an
unreliable  element  and  was  suspected  of  espionage,  this  time  for  the  Russians.  The
picture  given  in  Austrian  reports  about  the  Jewish  behaviour  during  the  Russian
occupation is an ambivalent one: 
“The Jewry was devoted with heart and soul to Austria and hated the Russian rule.
Despite this every now and than cases of Slavic submissiveness to the Russians
occurred.  The  poor  devils  tried  to  soften  the  Russians  by  showing  excessive
loyalty.  Thereby  Jewish  businesspeople  did  dubious  business  with  Russian
officials.  Many  Jews  from  the  intelligentsia  also  worked  for  the  ochrana.  The
flagrant contradictions and differences of the Jewish psyche emerged here, too.”32
Such stereotypic views can be found in many other reports as well. But it was not only
Austrianhigh-ranking  military  or  government  officials  who  did  not  trust  the  Jewish
population. Consisting mainly of ethnic Poles, who for the first time for centuries saw a
real chance for the rebirth of an independent Poland, the new Austrian administration in
Galicia itself,  did so too.33 The mood was turning more and more nationalistic and the
tension between Poles and Jews was growing rapidly. An official from Dolina even openly
said to Jewish refugees after they returned to their hometown: ‘Why did you come back?
We do not need you here. We were happy to get rid of you.’ The re-conquest of Galicia was
not quite the liberation many Jews had hoped for.
28 General Max Hoffmann, the German General-Chef of Staff at he eastern Front, admitted that the German Army tried to 
use Russian Jews for spying, but were not very successful. Cf. Hoffmann, Max: Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmajors Max
Hoffmann. Ed. by Karl Friedrich Nowak. 2 Vols. Berlin 1929, here Vol. 2, p. 24. And General P. G: Kurlov confessed that 
despite the general accusations of Jews of espionage, according the to Russian counterintelligence there was no prove the 
Jews were spying more often for the Central Powers than other ethnic groups. Cf. Kamaroff-Kurloff, P. G.: Das Ende des 
russischen Kaisertums. Persönliche Erinnerungen des Chefs der Russischen Geheimpolizei. Berlin 1930, p. 316. 
29 Cf. e. g. Kraus, Dorothy: My Mother was the Most Beautiful! Souvenirs of a Child of Wyssoka-Litovsk, Poland. In: YIVO 
RG 116 Poland I Territorial Collection Box 19 Folder 1, p. 25–26.
3
 Leo Baeck Institute New York (hereafter LBI) ME 908: Dr. Theodor Rosenthal: Erinnerungen, p. 40.
31 See on the Jews under the reign of the Central Powers in general: Schuster: Fronten 2004, pp. 235–418.
32 ÖStA Haus-, Hof, und Staatsarchiv PA I 831 Liasse Krieg 3d. Zl 398/15 pp. 7–8. Similar statements can be found in other 
reports e. g. a report of the Galician governor Statthalter Hermann von Korytowski. ÖStA AVA MdI Präs. 22. Zl. 4703/15 p. 7, 
or a report by General von Riml. ÖStA AVA MdI Präs. 19/3. Zl. 17256/15, p. 17. Cf. Schuster: Fronten. pp. 242-249; Schuster: 
Blitz (2008), pp. 46–51. 
33 Cf. Central Zionist Archives Jerusalem, Z3 155, where a lot of material on the Antissemitic attitude of the Galician 
bureaucracy. The following quotation is taken from appendix D, p. 2.
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The  situation for  the  Jewry  in  the newly  conquered  former  Russian  territories  of
Poland was slightly different, but again, was not easy. The economic measures of the new
occupiers led in the end to a total collapse of the economy, of local commerce, trade and
craft, in which most Jewish families earned a living, and which therefore hit them very
hard. Chane Kahan, a13 year old girl from Siedlce, described in autumn 1915 this situation
vividly in her diary: 
“The Germans take everything they can lay their hands on. Prices are sky high and
there’s no work. People are starving. You cannot earn anything, or do business
with the  Germans.  They  don’t  need  merchants  or  artisans.  They  take  the  raw
materials and manufacture things in Germany. A pound of dark bread costs ten
kopecks. In Warsaw bread is 25 kopecks a pound. You have to stand in line for
hours to get it. No kerosene at all. Since candles are used instead of lamps, the
prices  of candles trebled. A poor quality of  sugar costs 60 kopecks per pound.
There is almost no meat or fat. The outlook for the future is grim. It won’t get
better, but worse. Everything is restricted, prohibited, forbidden. Not at all what
we expected!” 34
For  their  survival  Jews were entirely  dependent  on welfare  organizations or  were
forced to rely on smuggling and black markets. The luckiest were those who lived in the
countryside and had a garden or a little piece of land where they could grow something.
But Jews only in Galicia were allowed to be landowners and in Russia they seldom were
tenants.  Mostly  they  lived  in  towns,  and  could  not  leave  them  officially,  because  for
travelling  one  needed  permission.  One,  who  managed  to  get  permission  to  visit  his
parents,  who were tenants living in a village nearby was Hirsz Abramowicz, a leading
Vilna Journalist and intellectual. He wrote: 
“I was once returning with my small children from a visit to my parents, who had
given me some food. In Kaplica, near Vilna, a pood of potatoes, twelve pounds of
peas,  and  twenty-five  eggs  were  found  in  my  wagon.  The  junior  officer  who
carried out the inspection scolded me for this ‹crime›: ‹This is forbidden by law.› I
pointed out that I was not transporting the food to sell it. The children were afraid
and cried, but that had no effect. Having confiscated the contraband, the officer
issued me a receipt for what he had taken. Later on I stood trial in Vilna. I was
ordered to pay a penalty of one hundred marks. The confiscated food was never
returned to me” 35
In view of such a treatment, it is no surprise that the Jewish population of Vilna and
elsewhere in towns and cities was nearly starving, and that diseases like typhoid fever or
cholera continued to spread more frequently amongst Jewry, than amongst other ethnic
groups. The measures immediately taken by the Central Powers, like forced disinfection,
never produced the intended results, of controlling the epidemics. According to Abraham
34 Kahan, Anne: ”The diary of Anne Kahan. Siedlce, Poland, 1914-1916”, in: YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science 18 (1983) 
pp.141–371, here p. 312.
35 Abramowicz, Hirsz: The Germans in World War I, in: Abramowicz, Hirsz: Profiles of a Lost World. Memoirs of East 
European Jewish Life before World War II. Detroit/MI: 1999, p. 182–208, here p. 195, annotation *. This article first was 
published in Yiddish under the title: Di daytshn oyf di erter”, in: Pinkes far di geshikhte fun Vilne in di yorn fun milkhome 
un okupatsye. Ed. by Zalmen Reisen. Vilne: 1922. 
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Virshubsky,  one of  Vilna’s  leading Jewish  physicians,  who was engaged  in  the Jewish
community’s welfare and relief work during the war, impoverishment and malnutrition
and deriving from this, hygienic problems, were not the main reasons for this. Instead,
the  strong  German  focus  on  hygienic  measures  led  to  the  neglect  of  the  supply  of
provisions,  so  that  the  situation  increased  more  and  more.36 All  this,  the  army  and
administration officials neither saw nor wanted to see. For a lot of them the reason was
once again not the war-situation or the total exploitation of the occupied territories, but
the  Jewish  stubborn  unwillingness  to  obey  the  simplest  rules  of  cleanliness.  As  for
example Wolfgang von Kries,  the head of the administration in the German-occupied
part of Poland, wrote in one of his official reports in April 1916 about the spreading of
typhoid fever:
“The disease infected more then 90% of the Jewish population. The term used for
typhoid  fever  in  this  country:  ‘Jewish  fever’  characterizes  this  observation
sufficiently. The unspeakable dirt in the narrow and dark flats, the heaps of junk
and  rags,  all  kinds  of  vermin  and  the  disgusting  personal  dirtiness,  are  a
frightening effective basis for the spreading of this epidemic especially among the
poor Jewish social class.”37
One and a half years later he still complained that Jews do not like to keep themselves
or  their  flat  clean  and  even  on  rabbis,  lice  had  been  found. 38 This  supposed  general
uncleanness was seen as a moral corruption also,39 based on Antisemitic stereotypes once
more. 
Cafes  and Teahouses were opened,  where many Jewish girls  came in contact with
soldiers.  Not knowing much about Jews, many soldiers thought that there were fewer
moral  restrictions  in  Judaism  than  in  their  own  religion  and  culture,  and  therefore
expected to find Jewish girls more open. But although the German administration and
large  parts  of  the  Jewish  community  suspected  these  places  to  be  centres  of  illegal
prostitution, most of them were harmless.4
 
The decision to become a prostitute was not an easy one, especially not for Chassidic
Jewish women. Expected to become housewives and mothers,  handed over from their
father’s to their husband’s family, women could play an important role, but mainly behind
the scene. Often they were married to religious husbands, who devoted their lives to the
study  of  the  Torah,  so  they  had  to  keep  the  family  alive.  As  long  as  their  behaviour
remained in the scope of tradition, they were even admired, but if they went beyond, they
not only lost reputation but mostly the support of the Jewish community. The community
often closed its eyes to what happened during the war and pretended that such things like
36 Virshubsky, Abraham: Das folksgesunt an der teritsinischer lebensshteyger in Vilne beys der deytsher okupatsye”, in: 
Pinkes far di geshikhte fun Vilne in di yorn fun milkhome un okupatsye. Ed. by Zalmen Reisen. Vilne: 1922. pp. 81–108, here 
p. 82. 
37 Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie (hereafter AGAD), Niemeckie władze okupacyjne na terenie byłego 
Królestwa Polskiego (hereafter NwotbKP), Cesarsko-Niemieckie Generał Gubernatorstwo w Warszawie (hereafter GGW), 
Szef Administracji przy Generalnym Gubernatorze Warszawskim (hereafter VCh). Sygn. 5, pp. 15–16. 
38 Cf. AGAD NwotbKP GGW VCh Sygn. 10, p. 32.
39 Cf. APL Kaiserlich Deutsches Kreisamt Lukow 60. 
4
 Cf. YIVO RG 116, Box 19 Folder 1, Archiwum Państwowe w Łodzi (hereafter APŁ) Łódzka Gmina Wyznaniowa Żydowska 
(hereafter ŁGWŻ) 18.
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prostitution did not exist in the Jewish world. In Lodz for instance the German police
faced the problem that many women worked as prostitutes, 35% of these were Jewish. To
get  these girls  off the street,  they turn in January 1916 to  the community council  and
suggest the establishment of a house where the people can find refuge and work, as for
example in Kały.  But it  took months until  the council  reacted to the letters,  and later
found excuses, for why not much had been done, so that it took much longer to f organize
a refuge for Jewish women from Lodz. Judging from this correspondence the community
council was unwilling for a long time to accept that the problem existed at all. 41 And when
they wanted to act, it was sometimes already too late, because the connected problems
had become too large to handle. That Jews lived all over the world and had contact with
friends and relatives in different countries made it easier for some Jews to work in this
field. In a time of great social change in eastern-Europe, Jewish girls dreamed of freedom
and independence in the new world, which made it easier to find girls and press them to
work or prostitution after they had sent them abroad. No doubt, it existed during World
War  I.  Smuggling  and  prostitution  were  connected  matters  here,  too,  sometimes
organized by criminal elements.42 But as for how far the slave trade of Jewish girls, or
‘Mädchenhandel’ as it was called at the time, really played an important role during World
War I. is hard to say: Firstly,  trawling was very much restricted and the bureaucracy’s
attempt to keep everything under strict control and fight any kind of illegal prostitution
surely did not make it easier. Secondly, Jewish prejudices here fit exactly into the pictures
the occupiers had. As historian Desanka Schwara pointed out, talking about the Jewish
communities' attitude:
“It becomes clear, that for the different groups of society ”Mädchenhandel” served
as pattern of exploitation and for otherwise unexplainable incidences; may it be
the  disappearance  of  young  women,  a  job  offer,  a  strange  encounter,  or  an
incident, did not fit into the usual course of the day.”43 
Such  incidences,  when  reported  to  the  police,  matched  German  or  Austrian
expectations, more or less. What this meant can easily be shown by looking at one of the
numerous police or court files, for instance the one of Moses Becher from the Austrian
occupied town of Zamość.44 
The  investigation  concerning  the  27-year-old  newspaper  seller  started  when  a
policeman overheard a Polish woman talking about „the well-known spy Becher“. He was
immediately arrested at October 18th 1916. On closer examination it became evident that
the allegation was based only speculation the woman had overheard four years earlier.
Another Pole had seen Becher the day before the Russians left town, demanding money
41 Cf. APŁ ŁGWŻ 45.
42 On the connection between smuggling and prostitution, and on how it was in some cases organized by criminal bands, 
see the illuminating novel by Ozer Varshavski: ”Shmuglers”, in: Unter Okupatsye. Ed. by Shmuel Roshanski. Buenos Aires 
1969. pp. 21–315.
43 Schwara, Desanka: »Ojfn weg schtejt a bojm«. Jüdische Kindheit und Jugend in Galizien, Kongreßpolen, Litauen und 
Rußland 1881-1939. (Lebenswelten osteuropäischer Juden 5). Köln, Weimar, Wien 1999, p. 350.
44 Cf. AGAD K. u. k. Militärgeneralgouvernement in Polen, Lublin (hereafter MGG) 203 NA Präs. Zl. 13931/16; MGG 363 NA 
Präs Zl. 4080/17; 4551/17; NA Präs Zl. 5113/17. All the following quotations are from this files and in my own translation. 
Another illuminative file, this time from the German administration, is e. g. the case of Selig Glitzenstein from Lodz. Cf. 
APŁ Gericht des Kaiserlich-Deutschen Militär-Gouvernements in Lodz 1265.
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from a Russian Police officer, with whom he was supposedly friends. And as the informer
knew the rumour about Becher too, he simply assumed it was for spying. And the mayor,
too,  thought he was a spy because ‘he was dubiously hanging around in town and in
restaurants, to listen to conversations’, and commonly known as ‘agent in dirty money-
and  sexual-affairs  between  officers  and  the  local  population.’  That  he  was  a  dubious
character was also confirmed by Jewish witnesses who thought he was engaged in slave
trade but not in espionage.  In fact  none of the accusations could be proved true, but
instead of releasing Becher, he was sent to an internment camp in inner Austria, where
he remained at least until the beginning of 1917, maybe even longer. The reason for this
measure was that he was seen as a ‚strategic risk‘, as an investigator wrote: „Becher has,
like many others, too, served Russian Officers (‚money, girls‘), but he alone is suspected as
a spy“. 
As we see the Central Powers, too, suspected the Jews of espionage, only they did not
in corpore blame them and commonly make them responsible for their failures. And once
again there is a close link between epidemics, prostitution and espionage in the eyes of all
the occupiers. The basis of this view of the Eastern-European Jewry are the well-known
Antisemitic stereotypes  of the Jew as a traitor and destructive element who wants do
destroy the people they are living with and the states they are living in to reach world
domination. 
Surely not all of the non-Jewish soldiers and officers, who were confronted with the
Eastern-European  Jewry  in  its  actual  surroundings  for  the  first  time,  thought  of  the
Jewish world they saw, in Antisemitic terms.45 Some of them even felt pity for these poor
people. But very many of those who experienced the war in the east, found their beliefs
and prejudices confirmed, overlooking or ignoring the fact that their encounter with the
Jewish world took place in an exceptional situation of crisis. 46 This led to an increase and
then  an  eruption  of  Antisemitism  among  Poles,  Russians  Ukrainians,  Austrians  and
Germans after the official end of World War I. What happened in the years 1918 to 1921
made the years of 1914-1918 look like the good old days for most Jews.47 And in the long run
it had catastrophic consequences for the Eastern-European Jewry, because the picture all
sides had of each other, when they encountered each other again in 1939, was the one
formed in 1914-1921. When in 1939 German and Soviet troops marched into Poland, many
Jews were more afraid of Russians and Poles than of Germans (and Austrians), because of
what they remembered from a quarter of a century earlier. And the Germans, too, knew
what to expect, the Antisemitic picture of the dangerous Jew had proven right already in
1914/1915.  And this time, they knew - the Jews must not get any chance to weaken the
German army. This was made totally clear by the Nazi propaganda in the most notorious
Antisemitic  film  Der  Ewige  Jude (‚The  Internal  Jew‘)  of  1940,  where  the  following
45 See on the following in detail: Schuster: Fronten, 2004 pp.455–489. 
46 On the image some German occupiers had of the local population in eastern Europe, in this case the Baltics especially see:
Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War 
I. Cambridge/MA 2000.
47 On the Jewish relationships with this nationalities in eastern-Europe see e. g. Golczewski, Frank: Polnisch-jüdische 
Beziehungen 1881-1922. Eine Studie zum Antisemitismus in Osteuropa. Wiesbaden 1981; Vetter, Matthias: Antisemiten und
Bolschewiki. Zum Verhältnis von Sowjetsystem und Judenfeindschaft 1917–1939. Berlin 1995; Budnitskii, Oleg: Russian Jews 
Between the Reds and the Whites, 1917–1920 (Jewish Culture and Contexts). Philadelphia/PA 2012; Henry Abramson: A 
Prayer for the Government. Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times 1917–1920. Cambridge/MA 1999 and additionally: 
Liulevicius: War Land 2000, pp. 227–246.
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commentary  is  given  to  pictures  of  Jews  squeezed  together  in  the  new  established
ghettos:
“We no longer, as in 1914, only see the grotesque and strange of these dubious
figures, we recognize that here lies the focus of the plague which threatens the
health of the Aryan peoples.”48
While  the  east-European  Jews  in  World  War  I  were  still  seen  as  human  beings,
although dangerous and plague-spreading ones, during World War II, they were seen as
the plague itself by the Germans, which led tragically to their destruction. 
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